Abstract: Since 1996, when Korea's retail industry was liberalised, new store formats such as large discount stores, grew, it was widely believed, at the expense of incumbent rivals such as traditional markets and small operators. This paper seeks to empirically test this proposition: an important underpinning to new regulatory control policies. Research involved a spatial analysis of traditional markets (1,456), large discount stores (408), and SSMs (super-supermarkets or hypermarkets (729)) spread throughout the country, in order to examine the scale and scope of the influence of the new retail store formats. The research is supportive of the 'Traditional Commercial Activity Protection Zones', which protect small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
South Korea of inward retail investment since liberalisation in 1996. Note that Dawson (2007 p 373) explicitly bemoaned "the absence, in international retailing, of concept and theory that does not hang on the coat-tails of international production" before going on to theorise the problem and offering (2007 p393) four dimensions of change. (see also Dawson 2003, Dawson and Mukoyama. 2006) . The changes that we consider could be theorised as part of the diffusion of retail innovations literature (for example, Kaynak, 1985) . Equally, literature on global retail capital and financialisation would provide a suitable underpinning -as would literature on trade regulation since the political economy of world trade is a topic to fascinate. Together, the demands that trade be more overtly two-way and also the Asian financial crisis served to prise open certain Asian retail markets (Reardon et al 2003 , Reardon et al 2007 . As Wrigley and Lowe (2010) have noted, such trends can explicitly be linked to the activities of specific transnational retail firms (see also Coe and Wrigley (eds) 2009). In a useful summary of globalisation trends they cite South Korea as one of four emerging markets entered by UK retailer Tesco. Again, however, our concern lies less with the process of inward retail investment than it does with how a host nation may react. Two further approaches thus suggest themselves. There is, firstly, the regulatory role of the state. Indeed, Dawson (2007) alluded to this by questioning if policy makers should seek to devise policies that would provide time for local retailers to adjust to new competitive conditions. Such policies need not explicitly be linked to inward retail competition as Burt's (1984) work on the Loi Royer in France demonstrated. Tesco's 'home' country has not hesitated to regulate the activities of domestic and other retailers in the past (Hallsworth 1998 ) and a 1996 regulation -the sequential test which covers large stores -remains in force. This suggests an ongoing role for 'real regulation': government-driven legislation. Our second particular interest lies with the extent to which the host country is amenable, or otherwise, to the presence of newcomers. Though the late Arieh Goldman wrote extensively on Asian retail topics (see, for example, Goldman 2001), we especially draw attention to a 1999 paper by Goldman et al. Goldman was interested in how the 'wet markets' of Hong Kong might be so distinctive as to defy attempts by new rivals to lure away their customers. As will be seen below, others have commented on the loyalty of South Koreans to their traditional markets. This reinforces the view that barriers to entry need not be regulatory -though they often are (Wrigley and Lowe 2010 pp 22-24) .
For us then, the fact of market entry into South Korea by global retail giants is a given. Our focus is on regulatory responses aimed at ameliorating the effects of these changes on existing, traditional retail systems. That said, much useful information does exist as a result of research on the inward investors themselves. Consideration of such findings leads us to endorse the work of those who stress the importance of territorial embeddedness. Indeed, without such strategies, there might be little by way of successful inward retail investment to concern the host nations.
In focusing on regulation we parallel Kim D-R (2011 who noted 'the devolution in 1995 of environmental enforcement in South Korea' before commenting (2011 p 1050) that outcomes are 'contingent upon the broader politicoeconomic context'. We agree entirely and would add a further coda, introduced by Wortmann (2004) . This is that, whilst jurisdictions almost never protect individual local enterprises per se from new 'efficient' competition -unless the latter behave unfairly or anti-competitively -they do seek to preserve whole entrepreneurial sectors such as SMEs. Understandably so: SME activity underpins large corporations across the globe: often working closely with them. Wortman demonstrated that the policy in Germany did not discriminate between defending the value offered by industrial SMEs and by retail SME's. In Korean retailing, the change that drives the need for regulation has, on our time-frame, been provided by three transnational retailers from Europe and North America: Tesco, WalMart and Carrefour. Turning to our second theme we find that researchers viewing the topic from the entrants' perspective -Coe and Lee (2006) -have also noted the factor of the inherent receptiveness of the host nation. In respect of South Korean consumers, they noted (2006 p 77) 'The customers' strong nationalistic outlook and sentiments against foreign capital' and presciently, 'WalMart and Carrefour are perceived to be poor at responding to local customer's tastes' (see also Jin 2001 and Kim R B 2008) . They characterised the fact that Tesco entered Korea in 1999 (later than WalMart and Carrefour) via a joint venture with Samsung as territorial embeddedness and, especially, 'strategic localisation'. In 2012, of these three major international firms, only Tesco remains in South Korea. So, major retail TNCs, often with decades of experience in running freestanding large format stores in Western Europe and North America (Hallsworth and Evers 2002) export competencies, such as global production networks (GPN), IT technology and management know-how but may still be at the mercy of local factors. Coe and Lee (2006 p 77) wrote of initial low staff morale but local effects work often in subtly different ways -not all of which spell success. Two big arenas for such expansion are the growing BRIC economies and also the spectacularly deregulated former Soviet Bloc countries such as the Czech Republic and Poland. The politicoeconomic context -and a lack of strong local incumbents -has led the latter to grant the growth in their retail industry to TNCs, whereas our case study, South Korea, has seen competition with TNCs lead to a strong fightback by incumbent domestic retailers.
Real regulation
Returning to the issue market regulation, we do not have space here to cover the plethora of ways by which Governments can regulate retail markets. For example, Germany used store size limits and Japan utilised zoning laws to control the expansion of allegedly more productive, large-scale discounters (Boylus and Guiseppe 2001) . Liberalisation, too, can take many forms: including easing of regulations on opening hours or relaxation of merger and competition laws. As noted, the Korean government liberalised the distribution market in 1996 whereupon a number of foreign retailers entered the market bringing in their large format stores.
Here we focus on the impact on traditional markets rather than on specific individual small shops and find that decline was most prominent among small and medium-sized However, (see also DCLG 2010) sales in traditional markets continue to decrease despite governmental support and efforts, whereas the sales of competitors such as large discount stores, supermarkets, and SSMs continue to increase. The new wave of large discount stores and SSMs in the Korean distribution market has certainly led to a general restructuring though there remain other underlying factors. Key among them (Kim W 2011) is the Korean government's development policy which induces concentration of population in the Seoul area (see also Donaldson, 1979, Kim and Kim, 2000 
Analysis of the Competitive Landscape of Space among Retail Store Formats

Data development
The importance of location in retail business has been emphasized in many studies (Clarke et al., 1997 : Simkin et al 1985 Bowlby et al., 1984 Jones and Simmons 1987 where denotes population estimates of the raster cell , denotes a locally weighted value for tract , which denotes the eup (town), myeon (township), and dong (neighborhood) that the raster cell belongs to, and denotes estimated population coefficient for the land use which is denoted as . As for , equals 1 if the land use of the raster cell is , whereas equals 0 in all other cases. Also, the locally weighted factor ( ) is a controlling coefficient to ascertain that the total population counts of all raster cells belonging to tract , which denotes the eup (town), myeon The size of the raster cell depends on the spatial resolution of the land use situation map, but in this study, it was determined as 20m×20m. A regression analysis after eliminating the x-intercept presented an estimate of 0.0182 and r-square of 0.25 at a significance level of 0.01%.
Process and contents for Analysis
Data on traditional markets, large discount stores, and SSMs are built using a Geographic Information System (GIS) of the sort used in retailing since the 1980s (Goodchild, 1991) . A population density map for the analysis of spatial competition between businesses is made using the advantages (speed, the comprehensive range of data available, quality controls, and data continuity) of the GIS suggested by Clarke and Rowley (1995) . 3 The Korean government amended the Distribution Industry Development Act on Nov 24, 2010, and designated traditional market preservation zones to protect and preserve the tradition and history of the local distribution industry. According to the law, a superstore is not allowed to locate within a distance of 500 m from a traditional market or retail store, pursuant to the Special Act for Promotion of Traditional Markets and Retail Stores (Article 13-3 of the Distribution Industry Development Act of Korea).
Analysis of spatial location characteristics by types of retailers
As noted elsewhere, Zhu and Singh (2009) Korea makes a further interesting contrast with the US experience of WalMart which opened its first stores in small and medium-sized cities with populations of 25,000 or less and thus adopted a reverse hierarchical strategy with major elements of contagious diffusion Ashton, 1994,Graff, 1998) . Conversely, Korea's large discount stores entered large cities first and then expanded to small and medium-sized cities with populations of 100,000 or more: hence following a more typical hierarchical diffusion strategy. 
Population-based analysis
We have analyzed the spatial competition between traditional markets and large discount stores and that between traditional markets and SSMs, based on population. The results of our analysis are as follows: the population of regions with spatial competition between traditional markets and large discount stores and between traditional markets and SSMs is 16,610,000 and 8,810,000, respectively. Based on population, the spatial competition between the traditional markets and the large discount stores is found to have intensified to nearly double that between the traditional markets and SSMs. This is because the business districts of large discount stores are much larger than those of SSMs. Cities show strong characteristics in spatial competition based on population. Intense spatial competition between traditional markets and large discount stores is shown in the following regions, according to population (provided in brackets): Seoul (4,900,000), Busan (2,530,000), Daegu (1,380,000), Incheon (1,300,000), Bucheon (590,000), and Daejeon (500,000).
As with spatial competition based on area, we analyzed the regions that show the weakest spatial competition between traditional markets and large discount stores, based on population. For this analysis, we selected regions with more than five traditional markets and three large discount stores. From our results, the order of regions with the weakest spatial competition between traditional markets and large discount stores, based on population (provided in brackets) is as follows: Paju (44,000), Pyeongtaek (45,000), Gumi (46,000), Chuncheon (47,000), and Suncheon (50,000). In these regions, traditional markets are not seriously influenced by large discount stores. Accordingly, spatial competition between traditional markets and SSMs, based on population, is similar to the spatial competition between traditional markets and large discount stores. Again, this is because most large discount stores and SSMs are located in big cities. 
Location Status of Large Retail Stores and SSMs in CCPDs
As mentioned above, for the purpose of preservation of traditional markets, through the amendment of 'The Distribution Industry Development Law' in 2010, the opening of large scale stores within a 500m radius from traditional markets was limited for the following 3 years. Also, in 2011, the CCPD area was expanded from 500m to 1km. Based on the same law, there is a necessity to measure what effects the regulations covering 500m and 1km actually have. Our approach is to analyze CCPDs of 500m and 1km using the GIS to execute a Buffer Analysis. Inevitably this shows that regions with more traditional markets have more CCPDs and are especially concentrated on the Seoul Metropolitan Region plus the 6 metropolitan cities and the large cities in the regional areas. When examining the conventional commerce preservation district (500m) based on the spatial size of each city, the findings are as follows. They were, in order, Seoul City (9,317㎡), Busan City (6,980㎡), Daegu City (5,549㎡), Incheon City (2,741㎡), Ulsan City (1,985㎡), Gwangju City (1,469㎡), and Daejeon City (1,322㎡). On June 30, 2011, the government expanded the district from 500m to 1km because it was felt that CCPds of 500m did not offer enough protection for traditional markets. Using the GIS, our research analyzed the spatial size of the area included in the CCPD with the radius expanded from 500m to 1km.
The resulting ranking was: Seoul City (25,011㎡), Busan City (17,330㎡), Daegu City (12,904㎡), Incheon City (7,833㎡), Ulsan City (6,159㎡), Gwangju City (2,765㎡), and Daejeon City (4,018㎡), and showed a general increased ratio of 2~3 times..
When the CCPD is set at a radius of 1km, the total area with traditional markets at their centres covered a net spatial size of 2,490㎢. It showed an increased rate of 3 times (1,714㎢) compared to when it was 500m (776㎢). In the case of Seoul City and 
Possible New Locations for SSMs
In essence we see that , as in many other countries, policy has been enacted in response to change that has already taken place. Inevitably, early stores are developed in locations that may later prove to be overly impactful. A more proactive approach -involving a prior search for sites that will be approved -is surely superior.
An analysis of such possible new locations for SSMs is now executed: through 5 major phases. In Phase I, the population within an 800m radius which is the commercial domain of SSMs is spatially calculated on a nationwide basis. Inevitably, retail store formats tend to locate where a certain level of population can be found.
The population necessary to support a SSM was analyzed based on the commercial area (800m). After setting the national territory in pixels of 20×20m squares, the population within an 800m radius was calculated for each pixel. For the analysis, the Focal Statistics Tool in the ArcGis 9.3 was used. Predictably, the population of areas which can be called the commercial domains of SSMs were higher in major cities which are densely populated areas. In Phase II, the potential possible locations of SSMs are analyzed. Figure 8 The finalized possible location for SSMs (Seoul)
In 2010, the average population an SSM served was 24,092, and the number of areas with a larger population than this was extracted, revealing that the potential locations of SSMs were concentrated in Seoul City and the 5 metropolitan cities. The major cities in Gyeonggi Province, Cheongju City, and Jeonju City also showed more potential as possible locations for SSMs than other regions. In Phase III, the existing commercial domain of SSMs is extracted. This is because a new SSM is less likely to locate where a rival already exists and so such areas were excluded. We re-utilized results on the commercial domain of SSMs as previously generated. In Phase IV, the CCPD locations are extracted since, from 2011, SSMs are prohibited to locate nearby.
Again, we could re-use previously generated data on CCPDs and assess the extent of the increased area of SSM prohibition that results from increasing the CCPDs from a 500m radius to a 1km radius. Broadly, permissible areas will decrease by half (49%) from when the CCPD was set at 500m (970,711 ㎡) In the case of Seoul City and the 6 metropolitan cities, only a spatial area of 271,806 ㎡ will allow the opening of SSMs, which will show a decrease of more than half (58%) over the position controlled by a 500m radius. A large effect is expected in areas other than Seoul City and the 6 metropolitan cities where the advancement of large retail stores and SSMs is at a lower level. 
Conclusion and Implications
Traditional markets in Korea were believed to encounter difficulties because large discount stores and SSMs had expanded their businesses. In order to revive the SME economy, the Korean government now provides tangible and intangible support for declining traditional markets, which are mostly occupied by small business owners. Using a GIS we investigated locational effects of competition among the key players-large discount stores, SSMs, and traditional markets-on the distribution market. Also, we studied the likely positive legislative effects of CCPDs as a protector of retail SMEs (considered as social minorities). Note that, Kompil and Celik (2006) , when analyzing the restructuring process of the food retailing in Izmir, Turkey, pointed out that the foremost agent of retail change was the supermarket. Accordingly, Kompil and Celik (2006) claimed that the increase of supermarkets had a huge influence on the existing retail pattern and the traditional retail structure. However, our results contrast somewhat with Izmir because we found that, in Korea, spatial competition between traditional markets and large discount stores is much more intense than that between traditional markets and SSMs. We confirmed that the store format with the greatest impact on traditional markets and their SME traders is the large discount store rather than the supermarket. Importantly, too, rivalry is keenest from re-energised local incumbents rather than strictly from TNCs -meaning that protective legislation was not inherently pro-local. When investigating spatial competition between large discount stores and SSMs, we examined the 500 m zones and found that 79 large discount stores (of 408 retailers, 19.4%) and 213 SSMs (of 729 retailers, 29.2%) were actually located within traditional market preservation zones. This would seem to point to a failure of implementation in respect of the location management policy of large discount stores and SSMs. Therefore, aspects of previous governmental policy on improving the competitiveness of small business owners in traditional markets have been unsuccessful. We suggest that proactive policies -by central and local governments -to better regulate large retail stores are necessary. In March 2012, Seoul City set regulations so that it can limit the operation hours of large retail stores and SSMs (from 12:00 am to 8:00 am) and to mandate closing days to twice a month, and advised legislation to the affiliated 'Gu's. So, regulations on large enterprises such as large discount stores can have real effects.
Arguably, many of the regulatory laws which were legislated in developed countries in the 1980s and the 1990s have declined recently: sometimes with lobbying from transnational retailers (Sparks 2008) . In some developed countries, local governments still use regulatory laws, but fewer developed countries see their central government driving forward regulations on large distribution enterprises. In Korea, however, we find that the latest regulatory laws on large distribution enterprises led by the central government can be effective. However, a more robust long-term agenda for government may be to seek to improve competitiveness of retail SMEs rather than to over-regulate large discount stores or SSMs. In the case of Seoul City, because there are many government agencies and large enterprises in the city, it may be preferable in the long run to introduce Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) as in New York, USA and elsewhere. Although many local governments nationwide are holding various events and festivals with the central government funding, these projects are short-term and unsustainable. Overall, to maximize effective governmental policy support, SME retail business owners need both middle and long term systematic and scientific support. Recall that the pressures were initially thought to come from market entry by TNCs and their large format stores. In 2012, back in one of the source areas for such stores -Europe -Carrefour lost its European market dominance to Schwartz group: dominantly a small format operation.
These results have several political implications. First, the intense spatial competition among traditional markets, large discount stores, and SSMs directly influences the decline of traditional markets. From the perspective of revitalization, the prior inability of government to control locations of large discount stores and SSMs has simply accelerated the decline of traditional markets. Traditional markets are directly influenced by the co-location choices of their competitors. In order to secure long-term survival of traditional markets, the government should maintain regulation on the locations of retailers that are in competition with them but also offer a reasonable selection of locations for SSMs. The government must manage this policy strategically. Second, we found that the competition between traditional markets and large discount stores has a stronger influence in traditional markets than does the competition between traditional markets and SSMs. This can be seen as a natural result of the agglomeration economics of large discount stores. From the aspect of revitalization of the traditional markets, however, a policy that can ease the intense competition between traditional markets and large discount stores is urgently required. For example, for areas in which large discount stores are located, collaboration between the large discount stores and traditional markets can be a winwin solution to easing the competition. Therefore, the government should establish win-win measures for traditional markets and their competitors. We accept, of course, that there are many factors which may cause retail SMEs to fail. If more variables such as the internet, home shopping, convenience stores, etc. were to be used as dummy variables in spatial competition analysis, a more precise result might be obtained. Future research should seek to execute spatial analysis whilst considering all the variables which can directly and indirectly cause the decline of SME businesses.
